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Abstract
We present GMC2, a software model checker for GCC, the open-source compiler from the Free Software
Foundation (FSF). GMC2, which is part of the GMC static-analysis and model-checking tool suite for
GCC under development at SUNY Stony Brook, can be seen as an extension of Monte Carlo model
checking to the setting of concurrent, procedural programming languages. Monte Carlo model
checking is a newly developed technique that utilizes the theory of geometric random variables,
statistical hypothesis testing, and random sampling of lassos in Bu¨chi automata to realize a one-
sided error, randomized algorithm for LTL model checking. To handle the function call/return
mechanisms inherent in procedural languages such as C/C++, the version of Monte Carlo model
checking implemented in GMC2 is optimized for pushdown-automaton models. Our experimental
results demonstrate that this approach yields an eﬃcient and scalable software model checker for
GCC.
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1 Introduction
During the past 15 years, GCC has evolved from a modest C compiler, to a
full-blown, multi-language compiler that can generate code for more than 30
target architectures. The set of programming languages handled by GCC now
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includes C, C++, Objective-C, Fortran, Java, and Ada. This diversity of
languages and architectures has made GCC one of the most popular compilers
in current use.
Traditionally, GCC has translated source code directly to RTL (register trans-
fer level), a very low-level intermediate language, before applying any opti-
mizations. This inevitably rendered the optimizations performed as low level,
since higher-level semantic information such as data types, structures and
ﬁelds were lost during translation. To remedy this situation, the Tree-SSA
branch [19] of GCC has resulted in the addition of two new intermediate lan-
guages to GCC: GENERIC, which provides a common infrastructure for abstract
syntax tree analysis and optimization; and GIMPLE three-address code, which
provides a common infrastructure for CFG (control ﬂow graph) analysis and
optimization.
Together with their associated APIs, GENERIC and GIMPLE make Tree-SSA suitable
as a platform not only for the development of high-level code-optimization
techniques, but also for new static-analysis tools, applicable to all of GCC’s
input languages. The acceptance of the Tree-SSA branch by the open-source
community has led, during the past year, to it being merged with the main
line in Release Version 3.5.
In this paper, we describe a software model checker for GCC that we have
designed and implemented at the Tree-SSA level. Our model checker, which
we call GMC2 for GCC-based Model Checking, is an extension of the technique
of Monte Carlo model checking [8] to the setting of concurrent, procedural
programming languages. Monte Carlo model checking is a newly developed
technique that utilizes the theory of geometric random variables, statistical
hypothesis testing, and random sampling of lassos in Bu¨chi automata to realize
a one-sided error, randomized algorithm for LTL model checking. To handle
the function call/return mechanisms inherent in procedural languages such as
C/C++, the version of Monte Carlo model checking implemented in GMC2 is
optimized for pushdown-automaton models.
At the heart of GMC2 is a GIMPLE CFG interpreter interpret that traverses CFGs
using Tree-SSA statement iterators succ, tsucc and fsucc, interpreting each state-
ment encountered according to its semantics. Of particular interest is the
manner in which process creation and synchronization statements are pro-
cessed, which force a return whenever a context switch is required, as well as
function invocation and return statements, which induce a hierarchic structure
on the hash table GMC2 utilizes for lasso detection.
GMC2 and interpret are part of the GMC suite of analysis and veriﬁcation tools
we are developing for the Tree-SSA level of GCC, which additionally includes an
intra-procedural slicer and a BDD implementation of a symbolic-execution
R. Grosu et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 144 (2006) 27–4428
engine for GIMPLE CFGs. The tool suite is intended to provide an open-source
framework for GCC-based static analysis and model-checking.
The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows.
• By virtue of being implemented at the Tree-SSA level, GMC2 is at once a software
model checker for each of GCC’s 6 input languages and more than 30 target
architectures.
• GMC2 is an open-source model checker : its integration into GCC renders it
readily and widely accessible for usage, critique, and extension by the open-
source community.
• GMC2 implements the technique of Monte Carlo model checking [8] within the
setting of concurrent procedural programming languages. The version of
Monte Carlo model checking implemented in GMC2 is therefore optimized for
pushdown-automaton models.
• Our experimental results demonstrate that the Monte Carlo approach yields
an eﬃcient and scalable software model checker for GCC.
The rest of the paper develops along the following lines. Section 2 considers
the technique of Monte Carlo model checking. Section 3 provides an overview
of the GCC compilation process. Section 4 describes GMC2, our software model
checker for GCC, while Section 5 summarizes our experimental results. Section 6
discusses related work. Section 7 contains our conclusions and directions for
future work. The GMC2 model checker is available from [21].
2 Monte Carlo Model Checking
Monte Carlo model checking [8] performs random sampling of lassos in a Bu¨chi
automaton (BA) to realize a one-sided error, randomized algorithm for LTL
model checking. In this section, we provide an overview of this technique. In
Section 4, we show how to extend this technique to hierarchic Bu¨chi automata
(HBA) in the context of software model checking.
Bu¨chi automata.
A Bu¨chi automaton A = (Σ, Q,Q0, δ, F ) is a ﬁve-tuple where: Σ is a ﬁnite
input alphabet; Q is a ﬁnite set of states ; Q0 ⊆ Q is the set of initial states ;
δ ⊆ Q×Σ×Q is the transition relation; F ⊆ Q is the set of accepting states.
We assume, without loss of generality, that every state of a BA has at least
one outgoing transition, even if this transition is a self-loop.
A sequence σ = s0
a0→ s1
a1→, ..., where s0 ∈ Q0 and for all i ≥ 0, si
ai→
si+1 ∈ δ is called an inﬁnite run of A if the sequence is inﬁnite and a ﬁnite
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run otherwise. An inﬁnite run is called accepting if there exists an inﬁnite set
of indices J ⊆ N, such that for all i ∈ J , si ∈ F .
We say that σ is ultimately periodic if there exist i ≥ 0, l ≥ 1 such that for
all j ≥ 0, si+j = si+j mod l. This means that σ consists of a ﬁnite preﬁx s0
a0→
· · · si−1
ai−1
→ , followed by the “inﬁnite unfolding” of a cycle si
ai→ · · ·
ai+l−1
→ si.
The cycle is called simple if for all 0 ≤ j = k < l, si+j = si+k; i.e., the cycle
does not visit the same node twice. In the following, we shall refer to such a
reachable simple cycle as a lasso, and say that a lasso is accepting if its simple
cycle contains an accepting state.
Let S be a concurrent system, AS the BA encoding S’s state transition
graph, and ϕ an LTL property. Using the tableau method, one can construct
a Bu¨chi automaton A¬ϕ accepting the same language as ¬ϕ [5]. The LTL
model-checking problem AS |= ϕ is then naturally deﬁned in terms of the
emptiness problem for B = AS × A¬ϕ, which reduces to ﬁnding accepting
lassos in B [22].
Random lassos and hypothesis testing.
Instead of searching the entire state space of B for accepting lassos, we
successively generate up to M lassos of B on the ﬂy, by performing random
walks in B. The walks are uniform in the sense that they are generated by
imposing a uniform distribution on the outgoing transitions of the current
state along the walk. If the currently generated lasso is accepting, we have
found a counter-example to emptiness, and stop.
To determine the number M of lassos we need to generate, we aim to an-
swer, with conﬁdence 1−δ and within error margin , the following question:
how many independent lassos do we need to generate until one of them is ac-
cepting? The answer is based on the theory of geometric random variables and
statistical hypothesis testing. Let X be geometric random variable parameter-
ized by the Bernoulli random variable Z (deﬁned below) that takes value 1
with probability pZ and value 0 with probability qZ = 1− pZ . Intuitively, pZ
is the probability that an arbitrary lasso of B is accepting.
The cumulative distribution function of X for N independent trials of Z
is: F (N) = Pr[X ≤ N ] = 1− (1− pZ)
N . Requiring that F (N) = 1− δ yields:
N = ln(δ)/ ln(1−pZ). Given that pZ is what we wish to determine, we assume
for the moment that pZ ≥ . Replacing pZ with  yields M = ln(δ)/ ln(1− )
which is greater than N and therefore Pr[X ≤ M ] ≥ Pr[X ≤ N ] = 1 − δ.
Summarizing:
pZ ≥  ⇒ Pr[X ≤ M ] ≥ 1− δ where M = ln(δ)/ ln(1− ) (1)
Inequation 1 gives us the minimal number of attempts M needed to achieve
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success with conﬁdence ratio δ, under the assumption that pZ ≥ . The
standard way of discharging such an assumption is to use statistical hypothesis
testing (see e.g. [18]). Deﬁne the null hypothesis H0 as the assumption that
pZ ≥ . Rewriting inequality 1 with respect to H0 we obtain:
Pr[X ≤ M |H0] ≥ 1− δ (2)
We now perform M trials. If no counterexample is found, i.e., if X > M , we
reject H0. This may introduce a type-I error: H0 may be true even though we
did not ﬁnd a counter-example. However, the probability of making this error
is bounded by δ; this is shown in inequality 3 which is obtained by taking the
complement of X ≤ M in inequality 2:
Pr[X > M |H0] < δ (3)
Because we seek to attain a one-sided error decision procedure, we do not
consider type-II errors in our application of hypothesis testing: as soon as we
ﬁnd a counter-example, we stop sampling and decide (with probability 1) that
A |= ϕ.
The Monte Carlo model-checking algorithm.
For a BA B, deﬁne the probability space (P(L),Pr), where L = La ∪ Ln
is the set of all lassos of B and La and Ln are the sets of all accepting and
non-accepting lassos of B, respectively. The probability Pr[σ] of a lasso σ =
s0
a0→. . .
an−1
→ sn is deﬁned inductively as follows: Pr[s0] = k
−1 if |Q0| = k and
Pr[s0
a0→. . .
an−1
→ sn] = Pr[s0
a0→. . .
an−2
→ sn−1] · π[sn−1
an−1
→ sn] where π[s
a
→s′] = m−1
if s
a
→s′ ∈ δ and |δ(s)| = m. That (P(L),Pr) is actually a probability space
is established in [8].
Example 2.1 [Probability of lassos] Consider BA B of Figure 1. It contains
four lassos, 11, 1244, 1231 and 12344, having probabilities 1/2, 1/4, 1/8 and 1/8,
respectively. Lasso 1231 is accepting.
2 3 41
Fig. 1. Example lasso probability space.
Deﬁnition 2.2 [Lasso Bernoulli variable] The random variable Z associated
with the probability space (P(L),Pr) of a Bu¨chi automaton B is deﬁned
as follows: pZ = Pr[Z = 1] =
∑
λa∈La
Pr[λa] and qZ = Pr[Z = 0] =∑
λn∈Ln
Pr[λn].
R. Grosu et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 144 (2006) 27–44 31
Example 2.3 [Lassos Bernoulli variable] For the Bu¨chi automaton B of Fig-
ure 1, the lassos Bernoulli variable has associated probabilities pZ = 1/8 and
qZ = 7/8.
Having deﬁned Z, X and H0, we are now ready to present our Monte
Carlo decision procedure for emptiness checking of Bu¨chi automata, called
MC2 in [8]. MC2 consists of three statements. The ﬁrst uses inequation 1 to
determine the value for M , given parameters  and δ. The second statement
is a for-loop that successively samples up to M lassos by calling the random
lasso (rLasso) routine, described in Section 4. If an accepting lasso l is found,
MC2 decides false and returns l as a counter-example. If no accepting lasso is
found within M trials, MC2 decides true, and reports that with probability less
than δ, pZ > .
bool× lasso MC2 (BA B = (Σ, Q, Q0, δ, F), float 0 < , δ < 1)
{
M = ln δ / ln(1− );
for (i = 1; i≤ M; i++) if (rLasso(B)==(true,l)) return (false,l);
return (true,nil); /* Pr[X > M |H0] < δ */;
}
Theorem 2.4 ([8]) Given a Bu¨chi automaton B and parameters  and δ, if
MC2 returns false, then L(B) = ∅. Otherwise, Pr[X > M |H0] < δ where
M = ln(δ)/ ln(1− ) and H0 ≡ pZ ≥ .
MC2 is very eﬃcient in both time and space. The recurrence diameter of a
Bu¨chi automaton B is the longest loop-free path in B starting from an initial
state.
Theorem 2.5 ([8]) Let B be a Bu¨chi automaton, D its recurrence diameter
and M = ln(δ)/ ln(1 − ). Then MC2 runs in time O(MD) and uses O(D)
space.
In the worst case, D is exponential in |S|+ |ϕ| and thus MC2’s does not improve
on the space complexity of a typical model checker. In practice, however, one
can expect MC2 to perform much better than this.
3 Overview of GCC
The block diagram of Figure 2 provides an overview of the GCC compilation
process from source input ﬁle to object code.
The language-speciﬁc front-end of GCC translates a source input ﬁle to a (language-
speciﬁc) parse tree. The back end is largely language independent, and han-
dles code optimization and ﬁnal code generation. Traditionally, GCC translated
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Fig. 2. Block diagram of the GCC compilation process.
source code directly to RTL (register transfer level), a very low-level intermedi-
ate language, before applying any optimizations. This inevitably rendered the
optimizations performed as low level, since higher-level semantic information
such as data types, structures and ﬁelds were lost during translation.
Tree-SSA.
To remedy this situation, the Tree-SSA branch [19] of GCC has resulted in
the addition of two new intermediate languages (ILs): GENERIC and GIMPLE [16].
Together with their APIs, these ILs make Tree-SSA suitable as a platform not
only for the development of high-level code optimization techniques, but also
for new static analysis tools, applicable to all of GCC’s input languages. The
acceptance of Tree-SSA by the open-source community has led, during the past
year, to it being merged with the mainline in Release Version 3.5.
int main() { 1. int main {
int a, b, c; 2. int a, b, c;
a = 5; 3. int T1, T2, T3, T4;
b = a + 10; 4. a = 5;
c = b + foo(a, b); => 5. b = a + 10;
if (a > b + c) 6. T1 = foo(a, b);
c = b++ / a + (b * a); 7. T2 = b + T1;
bar(a, b, c); } 8. if (a > T2) goto fi
9. T3 = b / a;
10. T4 = b * a;
11. c = T2 + T3
12. b = b + 1;
13. fi: bar (a, b, c); }
Fig. 3. Sample C program and corresponding GIMPLE representation.
GENERIC realizes a common infrastructure for AST-level (abstract syntax tree)
analysis and optimization by providing a language-independent IL for all parse-
tree constructs produced by the language-speciﬁc front ends. GIMPLE is a C-like
three-address (3A) code which provides a common infrastructure for CFG-level
(control ﬂow graph) analysis and optimization. As usual, complex expressions
(possibly with side eﬀects) are broken into simple 3A statements by introducing
new, temporary variables. Similarly, complex control statements are broken
into simple 3A (conditional) gotos by introducing new labels.
Syntactically, GIMPLE is a subset of GENERIC. Each GIMPLE tree is used to con-
struct a GIMPLE-CFG, which itself can subsequently be converted to static single-
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assignment (SSA) form. Figure 3 shows a C program and its corresponding
GIMPLE representation, which preserves source-level information such as data
types and procedure calls. While not shown in the example, GIMPLE types also
include pointers and structures.
Once a function is translated to GIMPLE form, the Tree-SSA framework builds
its associated control ﬂow graph. Each node in the CFG is linked to a basic
block (sequence of non-branching instructions), represented as a GIMPLE AST. CFG
transitions correspond to (conditional) goto instructions. For example, the CFG
for the GIMPLE program of Figure 3 is shown in Figure 4.
=
a 5
b
=
+
10a
Call Exp
=
T1
foo ba
+T2
b T1
=
>
a T2
if
B
CE CE: Compound Exp
GIMPLE TREEExit
FUNCTION_DECL
Entry
b c T1 T2 T3
intint
T4a
int int intintint
bar (a, b, c);
return;
T3 = b / a;
c = T3 + T4;
b = b + 1;
T4 = b * a;
a = 5;
b = a + 10;
T1 = foo(a, b);
T2 = b + T1;
if (a>T2) goto B;
A
true talse
C
B
CE
CE
CE
Fig. 4. Control ﬂow graph for example C program.
The Tree-SSA API provides functions to manipulate and traverse CFGs, their
associated ASTs, and their list of variables. For example, succ returns the
address of the immediate successor of a non-branching statement, and tsucc
and fsucc return the address of the immediate true and respectively false suc-
cessor of a branching statement. Similarly, if a is a variable in a CFG, its
type attribute a.type is also a GIMPLE AST containing various information such
as type name, size, and alignment. Basic data-ﬂow, control-ﬂow, alias and
reachability-analysis routines are also provided by the Tree-SSA API.
4 Monte Carlo Software Model Checking
We have implemented a software model checker for GCC based on the generic
Monte-Carlo model-checking algorithm of Section 2. Our model checker, GMC2,
is applicable to any program written in one of the procedural languages sup-
ported by GCC, e.g. C. Call this program the target program to be veriﬁed.
GMC2 also requires as input a procedure or function, call it the property func-
tion, representing the LTL property of interest. The target program can con-
tain concurrency primitives similar to those supported by the Verisoft model
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checker [6]. In the case of safety properties, the property function is called
to check for property violations in the target program. In the case of liveness
properties, the property function is called to check if an accepting state of
the target program is visited inﬁnitely often, viewing the target program as a
succinct representation of a Bu¨chi automaton.
GMC2 operates at the Tree-SSA level and assumes that the target program
and property function have been compiled into CFGs. Let P be the array of CFGs
corresponding to the target program, one for each of its functions, and let ϕ
be the CFG for the property function. At the heart of GMC2 is a CFG interpreter
that traverses the CFGs in P using Tree-SSA’s statement iterators and interprets
the statements contained in the CFGs according to their semantics. This allows
GMC2 to generate the random lassos of the target program on the ﬂy.
4.1 The Main Routine
Due to space considerations, we limit our discussion to the treatment of safety
properties. Given an array of P of CFGs for the target C program, a CFG ϕ
for the C function encoding a safety property, and parameters  and δ, GMC2
successively generates at most ln(δ)/ ln(1−) random lassos of P; see Section 2.
While generating a lasso, ϕ is called to check whether or not ϕ is violated in the
newly reached program state. If so, GMC2 stops and returns the counter-example
path leading to the violating state. If all states of all sampled executions
satisfy ϕ, GMC2 stops and reports with conﬁdence greater than 1−δ that it
rejects H0
.
= pZ ≥ .
At the heart of GMC2 is the rLasso routine for generating random lassos; rLasso
conducts a random execution of the CFGs in P by interpreting their (possibly
concurrent) C statements and checking for property violations.
4.2 The rLasso Random-Lasso Routine
In order to detect (global) lassos, the (concurrent) program state is stored in a
hash table ht each time a context switch occurs. This is for eﬃciency purposes:
the alternative, less eﬃcient approach would be to store the program state
after each statement execution. To ensure the soundness of this approach, we
assume that the time between context switches is ﬁnite.
bool× lasso rLasso() /* global cfg array P, cfg ϕ */
{
hashTbl ht = ∅; ready list ready = ∅; bool× state (f,s) = rInit();
while (s ∈ ht) {
insert(ht,s); if (¬f) return (true,lasso(ht));
(f,s) = rNext(s); }
return (false,lasso(ht));
}
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Hash table.
The ht hash table is optimized so that common information among global
states is shared. It is also hierarchic in the sense that all states belonging to
a callee are linked to each other so that they can easily be removed from ht
when the callee returns.
The pseudo-code for the rLasso routine is given above. The ﬁrst line sets
ht and ready to empty, and initializes the violation ﬂag f and the current-state
variable s by calling routine rInit. The while-loop searches for (violating)
lassos. If the current state s is not in ht, then it is a new state and is inserted
in ht. If it is also violating, signaled by ¬f being true, then a violating lasso
was found, which is returned together with the corresponding ﬂag to GMC2.
Otherwise, another random next state is generated by calling rNext.
4.3 Routines rInit and rNext
Given a set V of typed variables, a valuation (or environment) of V is a
mapping of variables in V to their type-correct values. If Γ and Γ′ are lists,
and σ is a list element, we write concat(Γ,Γ′), append(Γ, σ) and rest(Γ) for
the lists obtained by concatenating Γ and Γ′, appending σ to Γ, and taking
the rest of Γ, respectively, and we write Γ(i) for the i-th element of Γ. If ∆
is a stack and φ a stack element, then we write push(∆, φ), pop(∆) and ∆.φ
for pushing φ onto the stack, popping the stack, and for the topmost element
on the stack, respectively. If s is a statement, i.e., AST of a CFG, then s.a is a
child of s.
Program state.
The state Σ = (χ,Γ) of a concurrent C program consists of a valuation χ of
the shared variables (channels and semaphores) and a list Γ of process states,
one for each active process. The list is ordered by the order of process creation.
The state σ = (κ, δ) of a process has two components: the control state κ and
the data state δ. The control state κ = (γ, ν) consists of a function name γ
and a statement number ν within γ. The data state δ = (π, β,∆) consists
of a heap π, a valuation of global variables β and a frame stack ∆. Each
frame φ = (κ, ρ) of ∆ contains a return control state κ to the caller CFG and a
valuation ρ for the local variables of the callee CFG.
Routine rInit.
Execution of P starts in a random state Σ0 deﬁned as follows. All channels
in χ0 are empty and all semaphores are 0. The process-state list Γ0 contains
only the state σ0 of the root process. The control state κ0 of the root process
has function main of P in γ0 and 0 in ν0.
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bool× prgState rInit() /* global cfg array P, cfg ϕ */
{
sharedState χ = χ0; procStates Γ = ∅; frameStack ∆ = ∅;
cfgNm γ = main; stmNo ν = 0; controlState κ = (γ,ν);
lclEnv ρ = ρ0; forall (x ∈ dom(P[γ].param)) ρ[x] = random(P[γ].param.type);
frame φ = (trap,ρ); push(∆,φ); dataState δ = (π0,β0,∆);
procState σ = (κ,δ); append(Γ,σ); prgState Σ = (χ,Γ);
if eval(ϕ) return (true,Σ) else return (false,Σ);
}
The data state δ0 of the root process consists of the empty heap π0, valu-
ation β0 of the global variables, and stack frame ∆0 with only frame φ0 of
main pushed. This frame has a predeﬁned return control state trap (e.g. the
stop point) and a valuation ρ0 for the local variables. The valuation of the
formal parameters in ρ0 is chosen randomly within their corresponding range.
Function eval evaluates a CFG in the current state and returns its value.
bool× prgState rNext(prgState s)
{
/* global cfg array P, hashTbl h, CFG ϕ, ready list ready */
int i = random(|ready|); int nxt = ready[i];
return interpret(s,nxt);
}
Routine rNext.
Routine rNext randomly selects one of the ready processes and interprets it
by calling routine interpret, described next. It regains control when interpret
reaches a concurrency statement, which requires a context switch.
4.4 Routine interpret
Routine interpret traverses the CFGs in P, using statement iterators succ, tsucc
and fsucc, and interprets each statement according to its semantics. Of partic-
ular interest are the process creation and synchronization statements, which
force a return whenever a context switch is required, as well as function invo-
cation and return statements, which induce a hierarchic structure on the hash
table.
Since interpret may generate several states before it returns, it has to check
whether property ϕ is true in all of them. Properties to be checked may also
be inserted in a program, as assert (p) statements. The interpreter then checks
whether predicate p is true in the current state and returns with a violation if
this is not the case.
The pseudo-code for interpret is given below. Its body is an inﬁnite loop,
which according to the type of the current statement ν within the current
CFG P[γ], undertakes the actions deﬁning the semantics of the statement. Due
to space limitations, we consider a representative susbset of statement types,
which does not include heap and pointer manipulation statements.
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bool× prgState interpret(prgState Σ, int i)
{
/* global cfg array P, hashTbl ht, cfg ϕ, ready list ready */
channels χ = Σ.χ; procStates Γ = Σ.Γ; procState σ = Γ[i];
while (true) {
cfgNm γ = σ.κ.γ; stmtNo ν = σ.κ.ν;
frameStack ∆ = σ.δ.∆; globalEnv β = σ.δ.β;
switch (P[γ][ν].type) of
if: /* if e goto t */ {
ν = (eval(P[γ][ν].exp)) ? tsucc(P[γ][ν]) : fsucc(P[γ][ν]); }
assert: /* assert(e) */ {
if (!eval(P[γ][ν].exp)) return (false,Σ); ν = succ(P[γ][ν]); }
assign: /* x = rhs */ {
if (P[γ][ν].rhs.type == expr) { /* rhs == e */
ν = succ(P[γ][ν]); (∆.ρ:β)[P[γ][ν].var] = eval(P[γ][ν].rhs); }
else if (P[γ][ν].rhs.fnc == toss) { /* rhs == toss(e) */
ν = succ(P[γ][ν]);
(∆.ρ:β)[P[γ][ν].var] = random(eval(P[γ][ν].rhs.exp)); }
else if (P[γ][ν].rhs.fnc == fork) { /* rhs == fork() */
ν = succ(P[γ][ν]); (∆.ρ:β)[P[γ][ν].var] = 0;
append(Γ,((γ,ν),(π,β,∆))); (∆.ρ:β)[P[γ][ν].var] = |Γ|-1; }
else if (P[γ][ν].rhs.fnc == recv) { /* rhs == recv(c) */
c = P[γ][ν].rhs.chnl;
if (empty(χ.c)) {append(χ.c.swait,i); return (true,Σ); }
ν = succ(P[γ][ν]); (∆.ρ:β)[P[γ][ν].var] = fst(χ.c.queue));
rest(χ.c.queue); concat(ready,χ.c.swait); χ.c.swait = ∅; }
else { /* rhs == f(a) */
a = eval(P[γ][ν].rhs.act); κ = (γ,ν);
γ = P[γ][ν].rhs.fnc); ν = 0;
push(∆,(κ,ργ,0)); (∆.ρ)[P[γ].fpar] = a; }
return: /* return e */ {
e = eval(P[γ][ν].exp); (γ,ν) = ∆.κ; popLocal(ht); pop(∆);
(∆.ρ:β)[P[γ][ν].var] = e; }
send: /* send(c,e) */ {
c = P[γ][ν].rhs.chnl;
if (full(χ.c)) {append(χ.c.rwait,i); return (true,Σ);}
ν = succ(P[γ][ν]); append(χ.c.queue,eval(P[γ][ν].rhs.exp));
concat(ready,χ.c.rwait); χ.c.rwait = ∅;
}
σ = ((γ,ν),(π,β,∆)); Γ[i] = σ; Σ = (χ,Γ);
if (!eval(ϕ)) return (false,Σ);
}
}
For the sequential intra-procedural group of statements, we discuss the
interpretation of if and (simple) assignment. The former evaluates the
predicate in the current state and branches to the appropriate location by
modifying ν. The latter evaluates the right-hand side expression and updates
the corresponding local environment ∆.ρ (within the frame on the top of the
frame stack) or global environment β, on the location given by the left-hand
side variable, accordingly. By writing ∆.ρ : β we mean that both valuations
are considered and that ∆.ρ has precedence over β; i.e., we ﬁrst search the
variable in the local valuation.
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The modeling and veriﬁcation statements presented are toss and assert.
For toss, the interpreter ﬁrst evaluates the argument expression to obtain a
value v, and then it randomly generates a number within the range [0, v].
The obtained number is assigned to the location given by the left-hand side
variable, in either ∆.ρ or β. For assert, the interpreter checks whether the
predicate is true in the current state. If this is not the case, it returns false
and Σ. Otherwise, it continues with the next statement by updating ν.
The inter-procedural statements presented are call and return. For call,
a new frame φ = (κ, ρ) is allocated on top of the frame stack ∆; κ is the
current control state; ρ has the local variables of the target function γ initial-
ized accordingly by ργ,0 and the formal parameters evaluated in the current
state. Control is then moved to the callee by updating γ and ν accordingly.
For return, the interpreter does the following. First, it evaluates the return
expression in a temporary variable. It then restores the control state from the
frame stack, pops the frame stack and erases all the states corresponding to
the callee from the hash table. Finally it assigns the temporary variable, to
the location given by the variable of the statement pointed to by the control
state, in either ∆.ρ or β.
The concurrency primitives considered so far include process creation,
channels and semaphores. For simplicity, we only discuss fork, send and recv.
The other are treated in a similar manner. The fork statement is handled by
creating a new process (state) in Γ which is identical to the current except for
the value assigned to the variable on the left-hand side of the fork assignment
statement. This is zero for the child process and the index in Γ of the new pro-
cess for the parent process. The send statement is treated as expected. If the
channel is full, the process is put in the send wait queue of the corresponding
channel, and control is returned to rNext. Otherwise, the message expression
is evaluated and appended to the channel. Moreover, the process waiting in
the receive queue of the channel is awaken, by moving it to the ready list. The
recv primitive is treated in a similar way.
5 Experimental Results
To assess the performance and scalability of GMC2, we compared it to VeriSoft, a
popular software model checker from Lucent Technologies [6], on two C bench-
marks: dining philosophers and the Needham-Schroeder. VeriSoft and GMC2
were given the same C source ﬁles as input, each of which can be downloaded
from [21]. We also ran GMC2 on the TCAS benchmark. All GMC2 experiments
were performed on an Athlon 2600+ MHz processor with 1GB RAM running
Linux 2.6.5.
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Dining philosophers.
For this classical synchronization problem, we used a faulty symmetric
but fair variant, where the number of philosophers varied from 4 to 16. The
safety property we checked was deadlock freedom. Our experimental results
are given in Table 1. The meaning of the column headings is the following:
phi. is the number of philosophers; time is the execution time in mins:secs;
ce.len is the length of the counter-example found; states is the number of
states VeriSoft visited until ﬁnding an error; transitions is the number of tran-
sitions that VeriSoft traversed. The VeriSoft experiments were performed on
Sun Sparc Ultra-5.10 server running SunOS 5.6. Our experience shows that
the Athlon/Linux environment performs approximately 3.4 times faster than
the Sparc/SunOS environment.
GMC2 VeriSoft
phi. time samples ce.len. time states transitions
4 0:00.07 2 12 0:00.61 16 37
6 0:00.11 4 12 0:16.60 773 1171
8 0:00.78 11 20 2:57.29 5431 8449
10 0:02.17 31 24 10:41 17908 31433
12 0:04.82 24 27 > 2hr N/A N/A
14 0:06.22 22 44 > 2hr N/A N/A
16 0:11.56 14 32 > 2hr N/A N/A
Table 1
Deadlock freedom for the symmetric and fair C implementation.
Needham-Schroeder protocol.
This classic public-key protocol provides mutual authentication for two
parties, before they engage in a transaction. In 1995, Lowe ﬁrst reported a ﬂaw
in the protocol [14], by exhibiting an attack involving six message exchanges.
Suppose A is the initiator, B is the responder and I is the intruder. Then the
attack is as follows: (i) A sends a nonce to I. (ii) I sends same nonce to B.
(iii) B sends the above received nonce and its new nonce to I. (iv) I sends the
above received message to A. (v) A validates the authenticity of I and sends
the second nonce from the message back to I. (vi) I sends this nonce back to
B which now also validates I. We checked for the existence of the above attack
in a C implementation of the protocol we obtained from Patrice Godefroid,
who we greatfully acknowledge. GMC2 found it in 6 hours and 37 minutes after
having checked 10,682,639 lassos.
The same example and implementation was used in [7] to evaluate a novel
genetic algorithm. The time usage reported there is 2 hours and 33 minutes to
ﬁnd 3 errors, which is superior to GMC2 on this benchmark. They also attempted
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exhaustive and randomized search algorithms on this C program, neither of
which could ﬁnd an error in 8 hours. Their experiments were performed on a
Pentium III 700 MHz processor with 256 MB RAM. Unfortunately, the genetic
version of VeriSoft is not publicly available, and we could not reproduce this
result on our own machine. Its superior performance might be explained
by the sequential nature of the protocol implementation, which essentially
executes only one round of a reactive system. In this round, the system either
deadlocks, produces a counterexample or it behaves correctly. Hence, lasso
search seems to be less useful in this case than applying genetic heuristics.
TCAS.
The traﬃc alert and collision avoidance system (TCAS) is used on board all
US commercial aircrafts. It continuously monitors radar information to sense
whether a neighboring aircraft could become a threat by getting too close.
Such an aircraft is said to be an “intruder”, which is entering the protected
zone. In this situation TCAS issues a traﬃc advisory (TA) and estimates the time
remaining until the two aircrafts reach the closest point of approach. Such
estimates are used to compute the vertical separation between the two aircraft
assuming that the controlled aircraft maintains its current trajectory. Depend-
ing on the results obtained, TCAS issues a resolution advisory (RA) suggesting
the pilot to climb or to descend.
GMC2
property rule
bugs found time samples
1 No 0.23 1278
Safe Advisory Selection
2 Yes 0.03 147
1 No 0.25 1278
Best Advisory Selection
2 Yes 0.04 206
1 Yes 0.01 36
Avoid unnecessary crossing
2 Yes 0.03 180
1 Yes 0.01 27
No Crossing Advisory Selection
2 Yes 0.01 8
1 No 0.23 1278
Optimal Advisory Selection
2 Yes 0.06 217
Table 2
Running time of GMC2 for TCAS.
We have veriﬁed the RA component from Georgia Techs Siemens suite [20],
with respect to the speciﬁcations in [3]. Each property is veriﬁed by checking
the satisﬁability of two rules, with speciﬁc initial values for variables. The
details of these rules, initial conditions on values and the properties, can be
found in [3]. Our experimental results are presented in Table 2, where the
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meaning of the column headings is as follows: property name; corresponding
rule number; indication of whether or not GMC2 found a counter-example; time
usage in seconds within which either a counter-example was found or a pre-
deﬁned number of samples was reached; if a counter-example was found, the
last colum gives the number of samples taken to that point; otherwise it is
the predeﬁned number of samples to be taken: 1,278 corresponding to δ = 0.1
and  = 1.8× 10−3.
6 Related Work
At the conﬂuence of model checking, static analysis and theorem proving,
software model checking has become an area of intense research. Given a soft-
ware system S, software model checkers either work directly on S, or extract
a model M from S and apply more traditional model-checking techniques to
M . The software model checkers most closely related to GMC2 are those for
concurrent procedural languages, such as C/C++, and include VeriSoft [6],
Spin [11], Blast [10], Magic [2] and C Wolf [4]. In the case of VeriSoft, a ran-
domized search strategy based on genetic algorithms has been developed to
guide state-space search towards error states [7]. A comparison of the relative
performance of GMC2 and VeriSoft is given in Section 5.
The Cooperative Bug Isolation (CBI) project at Berkeley performs compile-
time instrumentation on a a number of large open-source projects and dis-
tributes the resulting binaries [13]. Information is then be gathered about
how many times a program terminated successfully or not. Subsequent statis-
tical analysis is used to isolate erroneous code segments. In contrast, GMC2 is a
model checker embedded at the Tree-SSA level of the open-source GCC compiler.
Other researchers have developed randomized methods for software ver-
iﬁcation and analysis. The key idea behind the program-analysis technique
of random interpretation [9] is to execute a code fragment on a few random
inputs in a contrived manner, which includes giving random linear interpre-
tations to the operators in the program. Both branches of a conditional are
executed on each run and at joint points, a random aﬃne combination of the
joining states is performed. In the branches of an equality conditional, the
data values are adjusted on the ﬂy to reﬂect the truth value of the guarding
boolean expression.
In [17], Monte Carlo and abstract-interpretation techniques are used to
analyze programs whose inputs are divided into two classes: those that be-
have according to some ﬁxed probability distribution and those considered
nondeterministic.
R. Grosu et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 144 (2006) 27–4442
7 Conclusions
We have presented GMC2, a software model checker for GCC based on the technique
of Monte Carlo model checking. By virtue of being implemented at the Tree-SSA
level, GMC2 is at once a model checker for each of GCC’s 6 input languages,
including C and C++, and more than 30 target architectures. GMC2 is also
an open-source model checker, and therefore readily and widely accessible for
usage, critique, and extension by the open-source community.
An important advantage of our approach concerns the treatment of point-
ers in GMC2. Basically, it is much easier to interpret pointer operations than it
is to statically analyze them.
As ongoing and future work, we are in the process of creating a software
model checking branch of GCC for the public distribution of the GMC tool suite.
Also, we are developing automated abstraction [1] and interpolation tech-
niques [15] to handle programs with inﬁnite-domain variables. Currently, we
are manually applying a form of bounded-range abstraction [12], for example,
on the TCAS benchmark.
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